The article first summarizes the assumptions of Luce (2004 Luce ( , 2008 for inherently binary (2-D) stimuli (e.g., the ears and eyes) that lead to a p-additive, order-preserving psychophysical representation. Next, a somewhat parallel theory for unary 1-D) signals is developed for intensity attributes such linear extent, vibration to finger, money, etc. The third section studies the property of bisymmetry in these two cases. For the 2-D case and the nontrivial p-additive forms, Proposition 3 shows that bisymmetry implies commutativity of the presentations. Bisymmetry has been empirically well sustained whereas commutativity has been rejected for loudness, brightness, and perceived contrast, thus implying that pure additivity must obtain in the 2-D context. By contrast, bisymmetry and commutativity are automatically satisfied by the p-additive 1-D theory. The fourth section explores the resulting complex of cross-modal predictions. For the additive 1-D case and the 2-D case, the predictions are power functions. For the non-additive 1-D cases, other relations are predicted (see Table 2 ). Some parameter estimation issues are taken up in Appendices B and C.
This article is concerned with sensory attributes of subjective intensities, what Stevens (1975) called prothetic continua, and predictions about their cross modal matches. The theories differ substantially according to whether or not nature has evolved pairs of sensors that normally work together in some interactive way. These paired sense organs are called binary or 2-dimensional (2-D) attributes. Two very clear examples are the eyes and ears and probably the arms for lifting weights. Considerably less clear is the nostrils and smell. Sense organs that are not so paired lead to what I call unary sensations or 1-dimensional (1-D). Some examples that have been studied in the literature are vibration, shock, taste of saltiness, and preferences over money Of course, binary attributes can be restricted to monocular or monaural stimulation which transforms them to certain unary cases (52) and (62) that, like the 2-D case, exhibit power function cross-modal matches.
The first section, A General Representation of Binary Sensory Intensities, summarizes the behavioral axioms and resulting representation that I arrived at in Luce (2002 Luce ( , 2004 and that has been evaluated for loudness, brightness, and contrast. Anyone familiar with those results should skip to the next section, A General Representation Of Unary Sensory Intensities, which develops from known results a new theory for unary attributes with quite different properties from those in the binary cases. Considerable new experimentation is called for. The third section, Bisymmetry, defines the concept, points out that it seems to hold empirically, and works out the rather different properties it implies for the binary and unary cases. The final section, Cross-Modal Matching, explores a complex of predictions arising from these theories. True, in many cases involving binary and the simplest unary cases, Stevens power law (see Stevens, 1975 for an extensive overview) is predicted, but in several other cases other predictions follow. I look at what Stevens (1975) reported for loudness, vibration, and shock. There seems to be evidence that matching shock and, indeed, several other 1-D continua to the other two may not satisfy a power law as was widely assumed in that early literature.
A General Representation Of Binary Sensory
Intensities Luce (2004) presented several behavioral properties relating two structures that model the psychophysics of subjective intensity. The first structure has the form hX ×X, %i for which X is interpreted to be the set of all physical intensities each minus its threshold intensity 1 (not, a transformed function of physical intensity such as dB units) when other features of the signal, such as frequency, are varied. So X is the non-negative real numbers with the unit of intensity measurement. Thus, for this measure of intensity, the measure of each threshold is 0. Pairs (x, u) are interpreted in psychophysics as presenting physical signals x and u to, say, the left and right ears (or eyes) simultaneously.
Suppose that the experimenter presents two pairs of signals (x, u) and (y, v) and asks the respondent to report which pair seems (subjectively) more intense, e.g., louder in audition or brighter in vision. If, e.g., (x, u) seems at least as intense as (y, v), we write (x, u) % (y, v). The ordering relation % is assumed to satisfy two properties: A1: % is a weak order in the sense that every pair of signals can be ordered and that the ordering is transitive meaning that for all signals (x, u) % (y, v) & (y, v) % (z, w) ⇒ (x, u) % (z, w).
And A2: % is strictly monotonic 2 in the sense that for all signals
We say that (unrestricted) solvability is satisfied in the sense that given any three of the signals x, y, u, v, the respondent can always select the fourth so that (x, u) ∼ (y, v), where ∼ means indifference in the sense that both (x, u) % (y, v) and (y, v) % (x, u) hold. A3: Solvability is assumed to be satisfied. Solvability is essential, for example, in (4) below which underlies the entire development.
In the second part of Luce (2004) and using solvability, A3, I worked with the symmetric matches (x, u) ∼ (z, z). What is involved here is for the respondent to adjust an intensity z until the pair (z, z) matches (x, u) in the sense that they exhibit the same subjective intensity. Of course, in practice z really is a random variable when a fixed (x, u) is presented and empirically matched by (z, z). Some form of central tendency is reported as the estimate of z. The estimation error plays a very significant role in statistical evaluation of whether or not certain indifferences (∼) are satisfied. See, e.g., the articles of Steingrimsson (2009 Steingrimsson ( , 2011 and Steingrimsson & Luce (2005a,b) for detailed discussions of how we have dealt with it in practice.
Because of both A1 and A2, the function z(x, u) can be thought of as an operation x ⊕ u from X × X onto −→ X that is strictly increasing in each variable.
2 Because of the brightness phenomenon called Fechner's paradox, monotonicity breaks down when one intensity is substantially smaller than the other. This seems to be more an artifact of the laboratory than a real-world actuality. Moreover, using perceived contrast, there seems to be no evidence of an analog to Fechner's paradox. 3 In Luce (2004) , the operation ⊕ was called ⊕s because I also defined the asymmetric operations ⊕ l and ⊕ r by
Because of the very noticeable perceptual changes encountered with ⊕ l and ⊕r, here I work only with the symmetric operation writing it simply as ⊕.
Because by (4)
which property is called idempotence, monotonicity, A2, implies that
In particular, 0 ⊕ 0 = 0. The second structure involves formalizing the method of magnitude production first introduced into psychophysics in mid 20th century by S. S. Stevens (summarized in Stevens, 1975) . This is described below in the Subsection The Magnitude Production Operation • p .
The p-additive representation
In the psychophysical context, Luce (2004 Luce ( , 2008 showed that there is a real, order-preserving representation Ψ onto the domain of physical intensities-that is numbers with a fixed unit-and if we assume Ψ is decomposable (A6) in the sense that for some function F strictly increasing in each of two real variables such that
then under our assumptions it simplifies to
which for δ = 0 and 1 was Eq. (18) of Theorem 1, p. 448, Luce, 2004. 4 If one is willing to include bounded Ψ, then δ = −1 also occurs. Moreover, in the context of utility theory, the range of Ψ is an interval of the full real numbers, and there it is important to include δ = −1. See Luce (2000 Luce ( , 2010 .
The representation (6) is called a p-additive representation because it is the unique polynomial that can be transformed into an additive representation, as is shown below. Proving that it is the only polynomial form that can be transformed into an additive representation is quite a bit trickier but can be done (see Aczél, 1966, p. 61) .
Using the operator notation ⊕, we may rewrite Ψ(x, y) as
and so (6) becomes equivalent to
It was also shown that Ψ and ψ ⊕ must also satisfy that for some constant
1.1.1 Transforming the p-additive representation to an additive one Because in Luce (2004) I missed the important fact that the p-additive form can be transformed into an additive one, I show that here. For δ = 0, Ψ is already purely additive, and for δ = −1, 1 it can be transformed into an additive form by rewriting (6) as
If we define
then (6) transforms to
Note that (10) implies that 1+δΨ(x, y), and so δΨ(x, y), must be dimensionless. This is because the integer 1 is dimensionless and because δΨ(x, u) is added to 1, it cannot have any unit. Thus, there is no gain of generality by setting δ different from either −1 or 1 in (6). Dr. Ng (personal communication) observed in joint work he did with Dr. A. A. J. Marley and me concerning entropy-modified utility measures (Ng, Luce, & Marley, 2009) . Define
Φ if δ 6 = 0 in (6) and Φ is defined by (10) .
Note that Θ is order-preserving and additive
by (6) when δ = 0 and by (11) when δ = 1. Note also that from (13) with x = y = 0, which recall are threshold values, yields
The error corrected in Luce (2008) , which C. T. Ng pointed out to me, is that I had incorrectly claimed that the p-additive representation (6) plus the empirically supported property of bisymmetry described in (36) below implied that δ = 0 (Corollary to Theorem 2 of Luce, 2004) . The specific details were not worked out in that errata. The purpose of section Bisymmetry is to fill in some of the details about the relations among the concepts of bisymmetry, commutativity, and associativity. Specifically, a simple representation that is equivalent to bisymmetry is developed in Proposition 2 below that is key to the next three propositions which are somewhat surprising.
The magnitude production operator • p
In magnitude production (MP), the respondent is presented with signal (x, x) and a number p > 0 and is asked to give the signal (y, y) that seems, in a sense to be discussed, to be "p times as intense as (x, x)". But we assume that the respondent interprets this to mean that there is a reference signal ρ = ρ(p) < min(x, y) such that the subjective interval from (ρ, ρ) to (y, y) is p "times" the subjective interval from (ρ, ρ) to (x, x). Either ρ is provided by the experimenter or implicitly generated otherwise. We denote this operation
Two assumptions are made about the operation • p . A4: The operation • p is strictly increasing, non-constant on a non-trivial interval, and continuous in p. And A5: The operation • p is idempotent in the sense that (15) reduces to
As with the psychophysical function, the two dimensional structure can be put in one dimensional form. And Luce (2004) showed that the resulting general representation is
which for those familiar with utility theory is the subjective expected utility representation if W is a probability measure. The expression (16) is equivalent to the magnitude production representation:
The special case of the operation x• p 0, which can be thought of as the binary pair (x, p), is assumed to be separable in the sense that it has a representation that is a multiplicative form of "additive" conjoint representation:
where ψ •p is the psychophysical scale for the structure hX, %, • p i and W (p) is a cognitive distortion of perceived positive numbers. The several measurement studies of that representation have rested on three different necessary properties of increasing advantage in carrying out empirical evaluation. The first was double cancellation (Krantz, Luce, Suppes, & Tversky, 1971, p. 250) . Next came the Thomsen condition ( Krantz et al., 1971, p. 250; Holman, 1971) , which is the special case of double cancellation by restricting % to ∼, i.e., with bold face signifying estimated signals:
And finally Luce & Steingrimsson (2011) have recently noted that Falmagne's (1976) conjoint commutativity rule (originally stated for random conjoint measurement) is, in the context of the other axioms, equivalent to the Thomsen condition, (19). It may be stated as follows. Define
which by (18) is equivalent to
Then conjoint commutativity is said to hold if and only if
Recast in the operator notation, this is equivalent to that the four indifferences
Notice that this is a quadruple cancellation condition. From early on (e.g., Gigerenzer & Strube, 1983) it was recognized that double cancellation is a very inefficient property to test empirically because of numerous inherent redundancies. And the Thomsen condition, which bypasses the redundancies of double cancellation, is also difficult to test because of response variability, especially the fact that the two hypotheses entail estimates, y and z, where z depends upon y; whereas the conclusion entails only one estimate, z 0 and the question is whether or not z = z 0 holds. The conjoint commutativity condition (21) has the great advantage of being statistically symmetric, but also the decided disadvantage that both sides of the indifference rest upon double compound estimates and so are quite variable at least when the compounds are not trivial.
Linking the two structures ⊕ and • p
At this point we have two psychophysical measures of subjective intensity ψ ⊕ and ψ • p . Clearly, we need to understand when it is possible to prove that there is a single psychophysical measure ψ that is both p-additive and that satisfied a conjoint condition analogous to (17).
I introduced testable behavioral invariances for each of the two structures separately and invariances that link the two structures in a fashion somewhat like the classical theory for the measurement of mass: Mass orderings can be generated either by the concatenation of (homogenous) masses on a pan balance or by the trade-offs between volume of homogenous substances and the various substances themselves. And a linkage in the form of a testable property is assumed between the two structures that permits one to prove that the two resulting measures of mass are, in fact, identical (see, e.g., Luce, Krantz, Suppes, & Tversky, 1990 Luce, 2009) . The appropriate linking properties, not explicitly called that, were formulated in Luce (2004) as segregation and joint-presentation decomposition. These were tested for auditory intensities by Steingrimsson & Luce (2005b) and for brightness by Steingrimsson (2011) .
A General Representation Of Unary Sensory Intensities
Of course, a substantial number of prothetic attributes, such as force, linear extent, vibration, money, and, perhaps, odor, etc. are unary as discussed in the introduction. That means that the theory we have used above (Luce, 2004 (Luce, , 2008 has to be altered to take account of the inherent dimensional difference. The primitives in the 1-D case are formally highly parallel to ⊕ and • p of the 2-D case but the former has such a different interpretation, as is discussed in the next subsection, that I use a different symbol,¯, for it, whereas MP operation • p is unchanged.
The primitives and their representations
The two binary operations need to be explicitly defined for unary (1-D) signals.
ConcatenationĪ
n the 2-D cases, ⊕ was interpreted as the symmetric match of the joint presentation of, say, x ∈ X to the left and y ∈ X to the right ear (or eye) respectively. Several testable properties were assumed and sustained in the first article in each series for loudness, brightness, and perceived contrast -each being a 2-D modality. For the 1-D cases, the interpretation is altered to mean simple physical concatenation of x and y, which, of course, means that the physical measure of x¯y is simply the sum of the two intensities: x + u. Thus, there is no experimental issue about finding¯. This case was modelled in physics by Hölder's (1901) axioms, heavily involving commutativity and associativity that for all signals x, y, and z,
This led, via Hölder's theorem, to a simple additive representation.
The p-additive representation ofĀ
s was true of (16) above, the mapping of the operator • p , (27) below, entails both addition and multiplication, i.e. the mapping is to hR + , ≥, +, ×i. So there seems no good reason to limit the representation of Hölder's concatenation axioms to a purely additive representation but rather to the full positive real numbers. Luce (2000) showed 5 that doing this yields the p(olynomial)-additivity representation
2.1.3 The production operator • p Let x and ρ(p), with x > ρ(p), be signals with x given by the experimenter, with a reference signal ρ(p) either given by the experimenter or generated by the respondent and which we estimate from the observed behavior in the light of the theory, and p > 0 is a number given by the experimenter. The respondent is asked to provide the signal z that is perceived as yielding the subjective "interval" from ρ(p) to z that is p "times" the subjective "interval" from ρ(p) to x. This is Stevens method of magnitude production for the unary case. Note that z is a function of x, ρ(p), and p that can be treated as an operation:
The operation • p is interpreted just as it was in the 2-D case. I have used the same symbol W for both the 1-D and 2-D cases on the grounds that it represents a cognitive function having nothing to do with the type of domain. It, therefore, leads to the equivalent representation (16) and (17). Of course, it is definitely an empirical question whether or not this assumption is justified.
Linking the two structures¯and • p
As in physical measurement, if there are two ways of manipulating an attribute -often a concatenation operation and a trade off, as in mass concatenation and density-volume trade off -there has to be some linkage between the two structures to insure that there is but a single measure of mass. In such a case, the link is a distribution law discussed by Luce, Krantz, Suppes, & Tversky (1990, p. 125) , and most succinctly by Luce (2009) . The key linkage between our two psychophysical structures in the 1-D cases is simply the property of segregation: 6 For all x, y ∈ X and p ∈ R + ,
This link is appreciably simpler than the linkage in the 2-D cases (Section Linking the two structures ⊕ and MP, Luce, 2004) .
Given the assumptions in Luce (2010) including (25), Theorem 4.4.6 of Luce (2000) showed the existence of a strictly monotonic real function, which to distinguish from the 2-D case, is denoted ϕ that is both p-additive, (24),
and satisfies (16) ϕ
which in Luce (2010) was numbered Eq. (12).
1-D theory and the form of ϕ
The p-additive utility case was worked out in detail in Luce (2010) who derived (26) and (27) (but using the utility notation U rather than the more generic ϕ that I use here), and Proposition 4 of that article derived the following representations: There exists a strictly increasing function g : X into → R + that is additive over¯which, because X is itself additive, means that g(x) is proportional to x and therefore:
(i) If δ = 0, then ϕ 0 is strictly increasing and onto R and
(ii) If δ = 1, then θ = 1 + ϕ + is strictly increasing, onto R + , multiplicative, and
(iii) If δ = −1, then θ = 1−ϕ − is strictly decreasing, onto R + , multiplicative, and
Although clearly cases (ii) and (iii) are different from power functions
that does not preclude the possibility that in the region for which data can be collected-say 0 to 100 kg in the case of one-arm lifted weights where the upper asymptote for younger, athletic men is probably less than 80 kg-the approximation is reasonably good. As was true in most of the Stevens-based literature, the reported data are based on geometric averaging over respondents which is surely misleading in the non-linear cases δ = −1, 1. For example, Figure  7 1A plots (30) so that at I = 100, ϕ − (100) = 2 3 of the asymptote 8 which yields κ = 0.011, and the dotted one is the exponential (29) so that ϕ + (100) = ϕ − (100) which implies Table 1 : For the mean and geometric mean of the negative exponential ϕ − (I) = 1 − e −κI , κ = 0.0110 with the 3 for the exponentials ϕ + (I) = e λI − 1 with the values of λ shown, the linear regression and a goodness of fit measure. The latter is the least squares measure normalized by the range of mean or geometric mean of ϕ − and ϕ + at I = 100 and expressed as a percentage. Figure  1B shows two more exponentials with λ = 0.051 ± 0.010. Figure 1C shows both the mean and geometric mean of ϕ − for each of these three ϕ + . Table 1 gives the linear regressions and least squares goodness of fit normalized by the range of the estimated means. In no case, are linear fits rejected and the geometric mean is slightly better than the mean.
Insert Fig 1 about here
Insert Table 1 about here It appears to be a challenge to devise experiments that can distinguish these average functions from (31). Galanter (1962) did some empirical work on power function utility measures, which Stevens (1975) describes, but he did not try (29) or (30) on individual respondents.
A good deal of further empirical work is needed to try to understand the relation of data to theory. One taxonomy we need is just how many of the 1-D cases have an additive physical measure of the attribute in question and so can be encompassed by Hölder's theorem? For those that do not, the current approach is not viable.
General Criterion for δ
Unlike the 2-D case, I do not so far know of any reason to rule out the δ 6 = 0 cases. So for each respondent one must estimate δ from data. That can be done by directly adapting the criterion that was established for utility theory (Proposition 2 of Luce, 2010) . Define p 1/2 to be the p-value such that
The number p 1/2 exhibits the following simple behavioral property: For any x, y
which follows immediately from (27) and (32). Of course, we cannot be certain in advance that respondents' data will prove to be so consistent. Note that (27) and (32) together imply
Proposition 1 Under the above assumptions about unary stimuli, then for signals x > x 0 > y > y
All proofs are given in Appendix A. Thus, the data collection involves, first, the experimenter using (33) to establish p 1/2 for the respondent. Then the experimenter chooses several sets of signals x > x 0 > y > y 0 . From these the experimenter generates the pairs of signals (x ⊕ x 0 ) • p 1/2 (y ⊕ y 0 ) and (x ⊕ y) • p 1/2 (x 0 ⊕ y 0 ) and presents them to the respondent, who is asked to state which is more subjectively intense. These data used with (35) should decide the value of δ for each respondent unless the data are not consistent.
For example, suppose that we are studying perception of weight to one arm and the measure of the attribute is grams which is additive. For the values x = 100 g, x 0 = 80 g, y = 60 g, y 0 = 50 g, then the comparison is which alternative is subjectively more intense
some pilot work may be required to get realistic values. It is not a priori obvious whether a particular 1-D attribute involves just a single value of δ or whether the three values correspond to individual differences of people. I think that the latter may be true for the utility of money (Luce, 2010 ) but I am not at all sure what is true for other attributes such as electric shock.
Summary
So, in summary, we need to verify empirically in the 1-D cases that the following three properties are satisfied:
1. The key axioms of Hölder, namely commutativity (22) and associativity (23) of¯. As was noted, there is no good reason to exclude representations involving multiplication as well as addition.
2. The key axiom of magnitude productions is the Falmagne conjoint commutativity rule (21) in terms of the defined function m p,q (a) (20).
3. The linking segregation law (25), which is far simpler in the 1-D cases than the 2-D ones.
4. A method was outlined for estimating the value of δ for a respondent.
5. Appendix C explores some of the other estimation issues that arise in the unary cases.
3 Bisymmetry
Binary Bisymmetric Representation
An operation ⊕ over binary stimuli is said to be bisymmetric if for all signals
Note that bisymmetry, (36), simply says that switching the two "interior" signals y and u does not alter the overall subjective intensity. To evaluate this empirically entails replacing each ⊕ by its empirical matching definition:
and similarly for the right side of (36).
Four Propositions Concerning Binary Bisymmetry

The representation of binary bisymmetry
Proposition 2 Consider a structure hX × X, %i satisfying the Assumptions A1-A6 of Luce (2004) . Then Parts 1 and 2 are equivalent:
1. The operation ⊕ is bisymmetric.
2. There exist a strictly increasing function ψ : X onto −→ X and a constant 1 ≥ μ ≥ 0 such that
And Parts 1⇔2 imply
Because we know empirically that commutativity in the 2-D cases generally seems to fail (Steingrimsson & Luce, 2005a , Steingrimsson, 2009 , submitted), we conclude ρ 6 = 1 and μ 6 = 1 2 . The form of ψ in (37) is discussed in Proposition 6.
Binary bisymmetry and commutativity of ⊕
The next result draws upon the paragraph following the Corollary of Theorem 2 of Luce (2004) which asserts that for some γ (8) is satisfied. Proposition 3 replaces Luce's (2004) incorrect inference that bisymmetry alone forces δ = 0.
Proposition 3 Under the assumptions of Proposition 2 and assuming that (6) and (8) 2. For δ 6 = 0, bisymmetry is satisfied iff commutativity 9 is satisfied in the sense that, for x, y ∈ X,
For loudness, and brightness, and perceived contrast, the data strongly support bisymmetry of the operation ⊕, (36) (Steingrimsson & Luce, 2005b , Steingrimsson, 2011 and equally strongly reject its commutativity, (39), (Steingrimsson, 2009 (Steingrimsson, , 2011 Steingrimsson & Luce, 2005a,b) . So, we conclude from these data that δ = 0, i.e., pure additivity, is satisfied and that it is impossible for δ 6 = 0. This fact simplifies considerably the Section Cross-Modal Matching.
Binary bisymmetry and associativity of ⊕
The associativity notion used next is that defined by Aczél (1966) on p. 253. For every x, y, u ∈ X, ((x, y), u) ∼ (x, (y, u)).
Proposition 4 Give the definition of ⊕, associativity is equivalent to
Proposition 5 Under the assumptions of Proposition 2 and assuming that bisymmetry is also satisfied, then the structure is not associative.
Recall that commutativity and associativity are both satisfied in Hölder's (1901) representation. In this connection Aczél (1966, p. 278) makes the insightful comment that "...[bisymmetry is] most used in structures without the property associativity -in a certain respect, it has been used as a substitute for associativity and also for commutativity (symmetry)."
Estimating ψ and μ
Recall Proposition 2 showed that bisymmetry is equivalent to x ⊕ y satisfying
In principle, were one able to collect sufficient data, one could estimate the unknowns ψ and μ. But in practice, doing that entails too much data collection to be really feasible. Matters are greatly simplified when, for any κ > 0, the following testable multiplicative invariance property is satisfied: There exists a constant β > 0 such that for every x, y with x 6 = y κx ⊕ κy = κ β (x ⊕ y) .
Proposition 6 Under the assumptions of Proposition 2 and assuming that bisymmetry is also satisfied, then multiplicative invariance (43) is equivalent to
So β is estimated by converting (43) into dB form leading to
Using a number of (x, y) pairs, see the degree to which the right ratio in (45) is constant. The degree to which it is constant yields an estimate of β. Then the estimation problem (42) reduces to finding the one parameter μ in the expression:
Unary Bisymmetry
There is a close 1-D analog to bisymmetry, which in the 2-D cases forced δ = 0, because of the empirical failure of commutativity. The following proposition shows that the 1-D case simply predicts bisymmetry:
Proposition 7 If the representation (24) holds, then bisymmetry
holds.
So far, I have not discovered a property for the 1-D case that forces δ = 0. This means that there is ample room for three kinds of individual differences in the 1-D cases. This was discussed in Luce (2010) for utility of money where it appears to correspond to risk-seeking, risk-neutral, and rise-averse types of people. It admits interpersonal comparisons of utility involving the first and third types. Of course, that fact considerably complicates the discussion of Cross-Modal Matching below.
Summary
The goal of this Section was to work out some important implications of the behaviorally supported 2-D invariance property of bisymmetry and to study it in the 1-D case. There are five theoretical findings:
• A simple weighted averaging representation is equivalent to bisymmetry (Proposition 2).
• A proof that when the 2-D p-additive forms δ 6 = 0 hold, then bisymmetry implies that the binary operation ⊕ must be commutative (Proposition 3). Because the loudness, brightness, and contrast data strongly support bisymmetry and strongly reject commutativity, we conclude that the binary representation must be additive, i.e., δ = 0.
• Bisymmetry precludes the commonly assumed property of associativity (Proposition 5).
• A fairly simple estimation scheme is given for the weighted averaging representation of bisymmetry mentioned above (Proposition 6).
• In the unary (1-D) case, the p-additive representation simply implies bisymmetry (Proposition 7).
Cross-Modal Matching
During the 1960s and 1970s, a substantial empirical literature developed concerning cross-modal matching; much of it was summarized by Stevens (1975) . The major theoretical contribution was Krantz (1972) and some of it is related to what was discussed under the 2-D case. He did not make the 1-D and 2-D distinction and so none of the distinctions I make below. In this section I use the subscript b to identify functions and parameters of the attribute with intensity z which is being matched to an attribute a with intensity x. And the notation differences-¯and ⊕, ϕ and ψ-identify whether an attribute is, respectively, 1-D or 2-D.
Because empirical data for loudness and brightness favor (43) (Steingrimsson & Luce, 2006, and Steingrimsson, in preparation b.) which implies (44), the 2-D functions ψ are power functions of intensity y ψ(y) = αy β .
The 1-D scales are, according to Subsection 1-D theory and the form of ϕ we have following representations for intensity y :
Keep in mind that, unlike the 2-D cases, the δ 6 = 0 cases are absolute scales. So λ and κ must have the unit of 1/x. Furthermore, we see that for δ = −1,
So, unlike either δ = 0 and 1, which are unbounded, the δ = −1 cases are bounded. This has implications below. Because this section is nothing more than the various combinations of matching (48) and (49), formal proofs are hardly needed.
2-D Matched to 2-D
Suppose that a signal x from a 2-D modality a is presented and that the respondent matches it by a signal z from a 2-D modality b. Of course, z is a function, z(x), of x. Then because each psychophysical function is a power function
we have:
Proposition 8 Assuming (48), the 2-D representations for ⊕ a and ⊕ b , then signal x on modality a and signal z on modality b match if and only if
where the parameters are given by (50).
This predicted power function accords well with the empirical findings for loudness and brightness (see Stevens, 1975 , for a summary). A very few articles cite some individual data rather than group averages.
1-D Matched to 1-D
Here there are 9 different cases Proposition 9 Assume that modalities a and b have the representation of Section A General Representation of Unary Sensory Signals, then matching ϕ b (z) = ϕ a (x) occurs under the following conditions:
Note that the three cases where δ a = δ b assert that a match is simply proportionality. These predictions seem to offer some guidance about what to look for in the literature on 1-D scales and their cross-modal matching.
2-D Matched to 1-D
We know that
and there are the three 1-D cases of ϕ a yielding Proposition 10 Assume that modality b has the representation (48) and modality a has the representation (49), then matching ψ b (z) = ϕ a (x) occurs under the following conditions:
1-D Matched to 2-D
For the 2-D cases, the theory and data have led us to the representation
And for the 1-D cases, (49) summarizes the three ϕ b cases. So establishing a match of modality b of 1-D to modality a of 2-D yields three cases:
Proposition 11 Assume that modality a has the representation (48) and modality b has the representation (49), then matching ϕ b (z) = ψ a (x) occurs under the following conditions:
δ b = −1 matches are not always possible.
Note that δ b = 0 is a power function but δ b = 1 is not. Thus, it is clear that we need to collect data for several 1-D cases and to see whether or not (62) or (63) fit these data. The only case that I know of that involves δ = −1 is the utility of money (Luce, 2010) , which of course is important. But according to this theory, it is not an effective attribute for cross-modal matching.
Summary
A major difference between¯in the 1-D and ⊕ in the 2-D cases lies in the key property of bisymmetry, (47) and (36), respectively. It is a necessary property in the 1-D case but not in the 2-D case. But it has been sustained empirically in the 2-D cases (see earlier reference citations). And the Section Bisymmetry Table 2 : Predictions of the two theories for cross-modal matches of modality b to modality a. Because there are 3 representations possible for 1-D modalities the predictions are more complex than normally recognized. Note the "prop." abbreviates "proportional" not "proposition"
showed (Proposition 3) that for the cases of δ = −1, 1 of p-additivity (6) that bisymmetry implies that ⊕ is commutative (22), which was rejected empirically for the ears and eyes. So the data force δ = 0 in all 2-D cases. By contrast the 1-D case rests upon both commutativity (22) and associativity (23) being satisfied. The matching predictions, except for the apparently uninteresting δ b = −1 cases, derived above are summarized in Table 2 .
Insert Table 2 about here 4.6 An application to Stevens (1959) cross-modality matching Stevens (1959) reported cross-modal matches between loudness of noise, vibration to a finger, and electric shock (see Figures 2 and 3 , which adapt Stevens, 1975, Figs. 33, 34, and 35) .
Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here
Keep in mind that loudness is a binary modality and both vibration and shock are unary attributes. Figure 3 shows loudness matched to vibration which means the first column of Table 2 Figure 2 , and the differences in exponents make the so-called regression effect (Stevens 1975, pp. 102-104, 271-272) natural. In Figures 3A,B shock is matched to loudness and to vibration. Suppose we explore the possibility that δ S b = 1. So with δ L a = 0 the prediction is that z is an approximate log function of loudness intensity x (63). And with δ V a = 0 then shock intensity is a log function of vibration intensity x (53). It appears best to assume vibration is a δ = 0 case whereas shock is δ = 1. A detailed evaluation of these predictions to Stevens' data has not been carried out. But such a potential explanation of the data, if sustained, seems less strained than Stevens' claim that they all are really power functions, with the latter two distorted by "adaptation" to the shock.
General Summary
The first section summarizes the theory and representation that Luce (2004 Luce ( , 2008 had earlier generated for subjective intensity judgment of inherently binary (2-D) stimuli such as for loudness and brightness. That theory has been favorably evaluated for individual respondents in articles involving various combinations of Luce and Steingrimsson. Except for my extensive work in utility, the second section is my first attempt at a general theory and representation for the inherently unary (1-D) signals of many other prothetic continua such as utility of money, weight, odor intensity, etc. It is fundamentally dependent upon the commutativity and associativity properties underlying Hölder's (1901) theorem. The two theories have much in common, such as p-additive psychophysical functions and a common magnitude production function However, the third section on the property of bisymmetry brings out a quite sharp difference between the two cases. The unary representation simply implies that bisymmetry must hold and I do not know any argument to exclude the nonadditive cases. The binary representation implies several things including that associativity of the joint presentations of signals cannot hold and that for the non-additive psychophysical functions, commutativity of joint presentations must hold. Earlier data on loudness and brightness established strong support for bisymmetry and equally strong rejection of commutativity of joint presentations. So we conclude that for the 2-D case, the psychophysical function must be purely additive. The fourth section uses these findings to predict cross-modal matching. The predictions for the purely additive psychophysical functions are simply a power function. However, when the non-trivial p-additive representations hold in the unary case, other possibilities occur which are summarized in Table 2 . 
Appendices
A Proofs
Proposition 1 Proof. Applying order preserving ϕ to
by (26) This is clearly satisfied for δ = 0. For δ 6 = 0, it reduces to
which is true because ϕ(x) − ϕ(y 0 ) > 0.
Proposition 2
Proof. Part 1 ⇒ Part 2. Aczél, (1966, p. 287) proves that an operation ⊕ is bisymmetric if and only if there is a strictly increasing function ψ : X onto −→ non-negative real numbers and non-negative constants μ, ν, and σ satisfying
Because ψ(0) = 0 and (5) this implies σ = 0, and so
Setting x = y in the above display yields μ + ν = 1, leading to the weighted average representation
Part 2 ⇒ Part 1. Consider the left side of bisymmetry,
Taking ψ −1 proves bisymmetry. Part 3. Given (64), observe that
Proposition 3
Proof. Part 1. Assume δ = 0. By Proposition 2 above with Θ = Ψ, and because Ψ(x, u) is additive as is ψ(x ⊕ u) so they are proportionate and so Ψ(x, u) satisfies bisymmetry and ρ = γ. Part 2. Assume δ = 1. By the same argument as in Part 1, we know that Φ(x, u) is proportionate to ψ(x ⊕ u. Then from (8), (10), and (38) for all
Setting Z := Ψ(0, x), this is equivalent to, for all Z,
i.e. commutativity.
Proposition 4
Proof. By the definition of ⊕
So, by monotonicity
And using monotonicity again
Proposition 5.
Proof. Assume associativity, (23), then because Proposition 2 is satisfied, repeated use of (36) yields
which is clearly equivalent to μ = μ 2 ⇔ μ = 1 and
a contradiction. So associativity cannot hold.
Proposition 6
Proof. Given x 6 = y,
and (43), i.e.,
we have
Setting y = 0, this is equivalent to
which for ψ strictly increasing and onto is known from Aczél (1966, p. 15) to be equivalent to ψ being a power function (44).
Proposition 7
Proof. Because the p-additive representation of¯, (24), is equivalent to
then Aczél (1966, p. 287 ) implies that¯satisfies bisymmetry.
B Estimation Issues for the Binary Representation B.1 Some simplifications
Proposition 3 together with the existing data showing bisymmetry holds and that commutativity does not hold imply that the representation must be additive. Steingrimsson and Luce (2007) argued empirically that W has the Prelec (1998) form:
Note that this specializes to a power function when μ = μ 0 = 1. In particular, their data supported μ = 1 for 6/6 respondents but μ 0 = 1 for 3/5 respondents. For the other 2, they tested and supported the behavioral property called double reduction invariance that Aczél and showed to be equivalent to (65). Previous conditions of Prelec (1998) and Luce (2001) worked only for the case W (1) = 1, which restriction was shown not to be satisfied by Ellermeier & Faulhammer (2000) , Zimmer (2005) , and Steingrimsson & Luce (2007) who not only present new data but summarize the entire family of results.
A desirable goal is to discover a way to estimate the parameters of the Prelec equations using double reduction invariance data in such a way that we can test for μ = μ 0 = 1 without running a separate experiment. One possibility is outlined below in Section Prelec With μ = μ 0 = 1.
B.2 The production equation
Suppose that we collect magnitude production data for various values of x and p in which case the parameters to be estimated are β, W (p), and ρ which may depend upon p and so I write ρ(p). The current evidence is that ρ only changes with the sign of p − 1 (Luce, Steingrimsson, & Narens, 2010; Steingrimsson & Luce, 2007; and Steingrimsson, Luce, & Narens, submitted) . The basic symmetric production equation (16) is
By (44) and because the constant (1 + γ)α r is common to all three power terms, it follows that
So to estimate parameters in (67), collect data for several p and x values, and then use some optimization technique to find the best fitting β. The estimated slope gives an estimate of W (p) and with that the intercept yields an estimate of ρ(p) β and so of ρ(p). 
B.3 Prelec with
From the double reduction data and the estimate of β, this plot then yields estimates of W (1), ω, and ω 0 and, of course, we can evaluate whether the special case of a power Prelec function holds.
B.4 Several observations 1. We cannot rule out a priori that the estimates of β using different p's will in fact be different; but if it turns out they are not different, then we can say β is a parameter of the respondent. Observation 3 below suggests that it may depend on whether p > 1 or p ≤ 1, but that is not predicted by the theory 2. We can develop a plot of W (p) versus p and try to decide how well it is described by separate Prelec functions for p > 1 and for p ≤ 1.
3. We can also develop a plot of ρ(p) versus p and mainly see whether it is flat or varies systematically with p. Again, the distinction p > 1 and p ≤ 1 may matter as in several other cases (e.g., Luce, Steingrimsson, & Narens, 2010; Steingrimsson and Luce, 2007; and Steingrimsson, Luce, & Narens, submitted) .
4. And, finally from the double reduction invariance data we can evaluate the adequacy of the Prelec function, we also can evaluate the special case of a power function, μ = μ 0 = 1. 
C Estimation Issues for the Unary Representation
If, as in the 2-D cases, the data support ϕ(x) = αx β , then Φ(x) = 1 + δαx β , which leads to the following expression for (69):
but no change in the form (67). So the estimation of unknowns in the 1-D and 2-D cases are the same, but substantial differences exists in the expressions involving¯and ⊕, respectively. This difference warrants careful empirical study.
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